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Summary 
Contrary to many other EU-Member States no large-scale or structural retrenchment 
took place in most social policy areas in Austria during the last years. This especially 
holds for policy fields most relevant to the social investment approach. 
Overall, it is even fair to say that recent decisions by the Austrian national government 
show a tendency to be very much in line with the idea of social investment, although 
the term itself is – until now – not used in the Austrian political context. 
Positive reform measures (accompanied by additional public spending) were decided 
regarding the policy areas of Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) and 
institutional childcare. With regards to services for long-term care additional funds 
have been made available (however at a level that does – by all likelihood – not allow 
for a substantial improvement when compared with the status quo).  
Benefits within unemployment insurance remained at about the same level and a 
reform of the minimum income scheme came with a number of positive effects from a 
social inclusion perspective. A related situation applies for family cash benefits, which 
have a very large impact on reducing the risk-of-poverty rate. Some increase of 
benefits were recently decided which will – however – not fully compensate for earlier 
devaluation due to lacking indexation. 
Spending for active labour market policies (ALMP) remained on a high level by 
international standards, and recipients of benefits from unemployment insurance and 
from the minimum income scheme (GMI) to a large degree get integrated into ALMP-
measures, which are available on a nationwide basis. However, with regards to 
additional personalised social services substantial interregional variations in availability 
appear to exist, with federal provinces and the municipalities being responsible for 
them in addition to the Federal Republic. 
The most evident challenge in the Austrian case is how to improve the quality of 
services in policy areas where a lack of availability is most pressing (especially long-
term care services ) and where Austria has a backlog when compared to European 
“good-“ or “best-performers” (especially regarding ECEC and institutional childcare). 
Here tight public budgets, a partial fragmentation of responsibilities (and political 
accountability) and different perceptions about “public” and “private” liabilities are 
some of the causes that restrict the speed and range of proactive reform. 
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1 Assessment of overall approach to social investment 
Austria does not follow a truly integrated approach to social investment. In the first 
instance this derives from responsibility for the different most relevant policy areas 
being divided between the Federal Republic and the federal provinces (Länder). 
In areas where the main competency for planning and implementation are held by the 
federal provinces, a substantial differentiation of accessibility and affordability of social 
services becomes evident. This especially holds for ECEC, institutional childcare and 
social services for people in need of long-term care. The Federal Republic has recently 
increased its efforts to enhance the uniformity of availability and quality of related 
services for ECEC and institutional childcare in particular, via instruments co-financing 
the upgrading of social services). However, regional differentiations will remain 
substantial from a mid-term perspective, with evident deficits in a number of federal 
provinces. A similar situation applies to the long-term care policy area. In this case 
additional investments decided by both the Federal Republic and the federal provinces 
are in many cases only sufficient to guarantee the status quo in a situation of rising 
demand due to demographic changes, but will not allow for a systematic upgrading of 
services and a reduction of related deficits. 
Regarding minimum income, where traditionally a huge differentiation existed 
between the different federal provinces, an agreement was reached in 2010 about 
uniform minimum standards, which lead to a replacement of the so-called “social 
assistance” by the Guaranteed-Minimum-Income (GMI) scheme. This reform came – 
from a social-inclusion-perspective – with a number of positive measures, but benefit 
levels remained below the at-risk-of poverty threshold. 
Regarding active labour market policies (ALMP), which is the sole responsibility of the 
Federal Republic, it is fair to say that Austria is a “good performer” by international 
standards. Furthermore, “sole”1 recipients of minimum income have full access to all 
ALMP-measures offered by the Public Employment Service (PES) since social 
assistance got replaced by GMI.  
Overall, it appears that the Austrian Federal Government (at least implicitly) shows a 
rather strong commitment to the idea of “social investment” and that this commitment 
has even been rising recently. However, in a number of policy areas Austria is in a 
rather unfavourable “starting position” due to the historical legacy of the so-called 
male-breadwinner model, which in different areas has led to a rather “familialised” 
(i.e. relying on family support social system), especially regarding ECEC, childcare and 
long-term care. At the same time the upgrading of respective systems is complicated 
by the fact that the political and financial responsibility for doing so is somewhat 
contested. The federal provinces argue that they need more financial resources from 
the Federal Republic to improve their social services, whereas the Federal Republic 
argues that the federal provinces should adapt their spending structure. 
Regarding the “problematic” policy areas of ECEC, childcare and long-term care, the 
regionalisation of the main political responsibility for these policy areas leads to a 
situation where improvements are gained only incrementally, thus prolonging 
problematic effects – inter alia the employment chances of women. A related situation 
applies for additional personalized services for unemployed persons with multiple social 
problems (e.g. excessive indebtedness, homelessness, drugs drug dependence etc.).  
At the same time it should be stressed that in Austria – contrary to many other EU-
Member States – no large scale retrenchment took place over the last years in the 
policy areas most relevant from a social-investment perspective. On the contrary, 
relevant budgets partly were considerably expanded. 
                                                 
1 “Sole” recipients of minimum income are persons who do not at the same time receive a benefit from 
unemployment insurance. 
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2 Assessment of specific policy areas and 
measures/instruments 
2.1 Support for early childhood development 
2.1.1 Early childhood education and care (ECEC) 
Austria for a long time followed a largely “familialised” (Leitner 2003) model of ECEC, 
leading to institutional ECEC in the age group below four years, and especially in the 
age group below 3 years, remained an exception to the norm.  
The situation has changed to some degree over the last two decades. But international 
comparative data on ECEC (based on the EU-SILC survey) indicate that the coverage 
rate of institutional childcare is still very low in Austria for children below 3 (only 14% 
in 2012; see Bouget et al. (2015), Annex 3, Table A3.1). The coverage rate is 
substantially higher (with 80% in 2012) for children between 3 and the minimum 
compulsory school age (normally 6), but still rather low when compared to many EU 
Member States (with coverage rates of 90% and above; see Bouget et al. (2015), 
Annex 3, Table A3.2). A closer examination indicates that the coverage rate in Austria 
is lower than the EU average in the 3-year age group (65% vs. 83.5%), but then 
increases to approximately the level of the EU for children aged 4 (AT: 90.9%; EU-28: 
91.9%) and 5 (AT: 96.5%; EU-28: 96.3%) (see Statistik Austria 2014, 14). This 
derives from the fact that many kindergartens in Austria only accept children from the 
age of four and Krippen (nurseries for younger children) are much less widespread 
than ordinary kindergarten (see ibid., 34ff.; Fink 2013a, 28). 
National data on ECEC (derived from federal provinces registry data) show somewhat 
higher coverage rates (see Statistik Austria 2014).2 Here, more long-term time-series 
are also available, as well as data by different federal provinces (see Appendix, Table 
A.1). Respective numbers indicate a continuous increase of the overall coverage rate 
of ECEC both for children below 3 as well as those in higher age-groups. What is also 
evident is a) the extremely low initial level of institutional childcare among children 
below 3 back in 1995 (at Austrian average only amounting to 4.6%; 2013: 23.0%) 
and b) the very substantial differentiation in the coverage rate between the nine 
different federal provinces (whereas this phenomenon is less pronounced for higher 
age-groups). Although there is some political debate on this issue, it is likely that 
these differentiations between federal provinces is not in the first instance caused by 
differences in demand, but by differences in the supply of respective services.3  
The latter is caused by services in the area of ECEC not falling within the competence 
of the Federal Republic in the first instance, but being to the largest degree within the 
responsibility of the federal provinces (as well as that of the municipalities). This does 
not only lead to a substantial differentiation in terms of general accessibility (in terms 
of the number of places available for the different age groups), but concerns also the 
more detailed features of the different systems in place (for a more in depth 
assessment see Baier and Kaindl 2011). Such differentiations e.g. apply for opening 
hours and the availability of childcare facilities during public holidays, where Vienna 
stands out as the federal province with the most encompassing offers available, with 
substantial deficits in many other federal provinces (often in terms of rather early 
closing hours and lack of availability during school holidays; see Baier and Kaindl 
2011; Fink 2013a and Statistik Austria 2014 for details).  One other issue is that of 
co-payments of parents, which applies in most federal provinces (see Fink 2013a for 
details), except Vienna, where childcare up to the age of 6 years is generally free of 
                                                 
2 Apart from the different data base, deviations from the data provided by Eurostat (based on EU-SILC) are 
also caused by a different reference date for calculating coverage rates according to age (see Statistik 
Austria 2014, 14).  
3 There are no logical explanations why e.g. the demand for ECEC for children below 3should, when 
compared with the other federal provinces, be considerably lower in the federal provinces of Styria and 
Upper Austria (where coverage rates are by far the lowest).  
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charge, and Lower Austria, where no co-payments exist for child day-care between 
the ages of 2.5 and 6 years.4 Co-payments by parents are normally applied in a 
socially adjusted way, or means-tested public subsidies are available. The respective 
regulations show considerable heterogeneity, and in a number of federal provinces no 
uniform model exists due to different schemes in different municipalities (e.g. in 
Carinthia and Vorarlberg) (see ibid. for details). Unfortunately, no detailed 
assessments are available for the case of Austria regarding the effects of different 
financing models and levels of co-payment on decisions of parents to use institutional 
childcare (or not).5 
It is fair to say that the availability and accessibility of ECEC gained increased public 
and political attention over the last two decades and that now the vast majority of the 
relevant political players concede that ECEC has to be further expanded (especially 
regarding children below the age of three to four years). The Federal Republic has so 
far followed the strategy of offering the federal provinces some positive incentives to 
enhance their systems of institutional childcare (and in particular ECEC for children in 
the age group up to three years), in the first instance via co-financing the start-up 
costs of new childcare places. A respective agreement between the Federal Republic 
and the federal provinces (agreed in 2011) comprised of related subsidies by the 
Federal Republic amounting to €10 million in 2011, and to €15 million in 2012, 2013 
and 2014.6 In 2014, the agreement was prolonged (until 2017) as well as expanded in 
financial terms. Subsidies made available by the Federal Republic now amount to €100 
million in 2014 and 2015, and to €52.5 million both in 2016 and 2017.7 The declared 
goal of this measure is to improve the situation vis-a-vis the Barcelona-goal of an 
ECEC-coverage rate of 33% for children below 3, to expand opening hours of existing 
institutions as well as to close regional gaps of accessibility for children above 3. 
Evidently, the envisaged additional investments dedicated to ECEC will help improve 
the respective situations. However, given the substantial existing differences in the 
availability of ECEC-services between the different federal provinces (as well as within 
some federal provinces) even more efforts would be necessary to achieve a more 
substantial improvement and harmonization more quickly.8     
2.1.2 Family benefits (cash and in-kind) 
Social protection expenditure for the familychildren function is comparatively high in 
Austria from an international comparative perspective (see Bouget et al. (2015), 
Annex 3, Table A.2). In 2012 it amounted to 3.3% of GDP (EU-28: 2.3%; see 
Appendix, Chart A.1). Furthermore, the bulk of related outlays amounts to cash 
benefits, most of which are not means tested, with the rather generous universal 
family benefits being the most important single transfer in this policy area. When 
compared to cash benefits and also compared to a number of EU Member States 
(especially the Nordic countries), the expenses for benefits in kind dedicated to 
families and children are comparatively low in Austria (see Bouget et al. (2015), 
Annex 3, Chart B.1).9 
                                                 
4 As a general principle, as from the kindergarten-year 20092010, the “last year of kindergarten” (in the age 
56) is free of charge in all federal provinces, however only up to 20 hours a week; for more details see: 
https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent37Seite.370130.html .  
5 Private fees for childcare appear to be rather low by international standards (see Annex table B7.4). But in 
fact the respective financial burden may turn out to be substantial even for families with rather low income. 
Fink (2013a, 33) gives the example of a family with 2 children (in the age of 3 and 4) and a net monthly 
income of €1,750 in the federal province of Styria. The related monthly co-payment would amount to 
approx. €130 per month, or ca. 7.5% of the net monthly income (in case of 7-8 hours daily care).   
6 For more details see: http:www.parlament.gv.atPAKTVHGXXIVII_01406  
7 For more details see: http:www.parlament.gv.atPAKTVHGXXVII_00187index.shtml  
8 The total public spending for institutional childcare in Austria in 2013 amounted to €1,932.89 million. 
Source: 
http:www.sozialministerium.atcmssiteattachments631CH2292CMS134685034955124_kindergaerten.pdf   
9 As a consequence, the situation regarding institutional childcare facilities is less favourable in Austria when 
compared to these countries (see above). 
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More detailed assessments indicate that cash family benefits (together with cash 
benefits towards families in the context of education) have a very strong positive 
impact on the at-risk-of poverty rate after social transfers (see Fink 2013a, 24-25). 
This type of benefits reduces the at-risk-of poverty rate of families with children to 
between ca. 8 and 23 percentage points (depending on the given family-
constellation), and to a larger degree than most other types of existing cash benefits.  
When looking at the presence of children of different ages, it becomes evident that 
benefits targeted at families and children especially reduce the at-risk-of-poverty rates 
of households with young children (for the age group of up to 6 years). Here, family 
cash benefits (Familienbeihilfe) and parental leave benefits (Kinderbetreuungsgeld) 
compensate to a considerable degree for lower income deriving from lower 
employment rates of parents (ibid.).10    
The universal family cash benefits (Famileinbeihilfe) are not regularly indexed in 
Austria, which from a mid-term perspective leads to a devaluation of the respective 
benefits granted. Measures decided in this policy area indicate a mix of decisions 
aiming at cost containment11 and then again expansive steps. In 2014, it was decided 
that family cash benefits would be increased by 4% as from 1st July 2014 and then 
again by 1.9% as from 1st January 2016 and 1st January 2018.12 The question of 
whether family cash benefits (Familienbeihilfe) should be changed to a more targeted 
or means-tested system is virtually absent in the Austrian political debate (probably 
due to the high political costs that would accompany such a reform). 
Due to space limitations it is beyond the scope of this report to describe and assess 
the multitude of other additional family benefits (in cash and in kind).13      
2.1.3 Parenting Services 
In Austria, parenting support has been developed at different levels of the political 
system by different institutions and different service providers over decades, which 
makes it difficult to give a clear schematic of the full range of parenting services that 
are available in Austria. The related stepwise expansion led to a substantial diversity 
of measures and organizations, with programmes by the Federal Republic being just 
one element. Other important institutional actors in the field are the federal provinces, 
the municipalities and private organisations, often with a Catholic (e.g. Katholisches 
Bildungswerk) or a political (e.g. Kinderfreunde) background. Some of them are 
Austria-wide, while others are specific to certain federal provinces, or to even more 
local entities. According to Kapella et al. (2012) Austria’s diverse parenting support 
services can best be described in terms of four major pillars. They are, respectively: 
youth welfare services, parental education, family counselling offices, and other 
services, such as psychological therapy (see ibid. for a more detailed description of the 
services offered and important developments in this policy area). What is worth 
mentioning in this context is that the so-called Youth-Welfare-Act 
(Jugendwohlfahrtsgesetz) was replaced by the Federal Youth- and Child-Assistance-
                                                 
10 Overall spending for family cash benefits amounted to €3,166.16 million in 2013, spending for parental 
leave benefits to €1,049.73 million. These are, together with the tax credit for children (Kinderabsetzbetrag) 
(with costs amounting to €1,299.59 million in 2013) the most important types of cash benefits towards 
families. Sources: 
http:www.sozialministerium.atsiteSozialesAllgemeine_SozialpolitikSozialausgaben_in_Oesterreich29_Sozials
chutzschemen_Oesterreichs and 
http:www.statistik.atweb_destaticaufwendungen_des_familienlastenausgleichsfonds_1980_bis_2013_02012
2.xlsx  
11 Like the reduction of the maximum age up to which family benefits may be granted (in case of further 
education) from 25 to 24 years (as from 2011) or the restriction, that unemployed young adults in the age 
between 18 and 21 may not anymore be granted a family cash benefit (as well as from 2011). 
12 See https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent194Seite.1940263.html for details. 
13 An overview on the different benefits available according to national policies can be found here: 
http:onlinerechner.haude.atBMFFamilienrechnerbmf-bl.html  
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Act (Bundes-Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetzes) as from 2013, which led to a number of 
improvements in the general national regulatory framework of parenting services.14 
2.1.4 Overall impact 
For Austria, no recent and detailed overall assessment exists regarding the effects of 
the above mentioned benefits and services on early childhood development and 
children’s well-being (see as well OECD 2013, 90). However, results of empirical 
research on intergenerational transmission of educational attainment indicate very 
unfavourable results for Austria from an international comparative perspective). In 
other words: the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment is very 
strong in the Austrian case (see e.g. Fessler et al. 2011; 2012). This may of course be 
caused by several factors, of which deficits in institutional ECEC is only one. However, 
as Esping Anderson (2005, 14) stresses, “[i]t is in early childhood that parental 
transmission is key.” International research results show that in families with strong 
human capital, very young children may benefit from close parental presence. But ”for 
the development of children born into less advantaged environments, external care 
tends to be more effective even at very young age and such children benefit from 
participation in early childhood education and care (ECAC) from a very early stage” 
(OECD 2013, 90). Given this background, the evident deficits and the very large 
differentiation in the availability of ECEC are likely to be an important obstacle against 
upward social mobility in Austria.  
Overall, a discrepancy exists in Austria between the rather generous cash benefits 
dedicated to families (Familienbeihilfe), which have a strong positive effect in terms of 
a reduction of the at-risk-of poverty rate of families, and evident deficits in social 
services in the area of ECEC. Recent attempt to improve ECEC will reduce related 
problems to some degree, but do not appear to be sufficient to effectively eliminate 
the backlog in this policy area from a mid-term perspective.   
2.2 Supporting parents’ labour market participation  
2.2.1 Child care 
The topic of childcare has partly already been dealt with above together with the issue 
of ECEC, as these two policy areas are usually addressed jointly in Austrian politics. 
The most important findings are a substantial differentiation in availability and 
accessibility between different federal provinces (which, together with the 
municipalities, are responsible for related services in the first instance), often 
substantial deficits regarding opening times and a lack of availability during school 
holidays, and private co-payments, which may imply a substantial financial burden for 
families with children (irrespective of the fact that co-payments by parents are 
normally applied in a socially adjusted way, or that means-tested public subsidies are 
available).  
At the same time it is fair to say that the situation regarding institutional childcare 
improved considerably over the last two decades (as indicated by substantially 
increased coverage rates; see Appendix, Table A.1), and that the current national 
government strengthened its efforts for a further overall improvement (see above in 
the chapter on ECEC regarding the expansion of national co-financing for new 
childcare facilities). Also well worth mentioning in this context are recent measures to 
expand all-day care for school age children. Since 2011, additional funds of €80 
million per year were made available from the federal budget to expand all-day care 
for school age children. In 2014, it was decided to increase respective funds to 160 
million per year (until 2018). It is planned that the number of available places should 
increase from about 119,000 in 2013 to 200,000 in 20182019, with the coverage rate 
                                                 
14 For an overview see: https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent171Seite.1710006.html , for 
details: http:www.parlament.gv.atPAKTVHGXXIVII_02191index.shtml  
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rising from about 17.55% to about 30%15 (for more details on all-day school care see 
Fink 2013a, 19f.). 
2.2.2 Long-term care 
The Austrian system of long-term care has a twofold design, consisting of cash 
benefits on the one hand, and publicly organised long-term care services on the other. 
The cash benefit is called long-term care benefit (Pflegegeld). Since the beginning of 
2012 long-term care benefits fall within the sole responsibility of the federal republic, 
whereas before the federal provinces also administered this kind of benefit (for specific 
groups). Pflegegeld is granted without means testing (against income or assets) and 
according to seven different levels, corresponding to a categorisation of seven 
different levels of individual care requirements  the health status of the person in need 
of care. The benefit currently amounts to €154.20 per month in level 1 (the lowest 
level), but may be as high as €1,665.80 in level 7. These cash benefits are intended to 
be used to buy formal care services from public or private providers or to reimburse 
informal care giving.16 In addition, pursuant to an agreement in Article 15a of the 
Federal Constitution Act (endorsed in 1993) the federal provinces are responsible for 
establishing and upgrading a decentralised and nationwide delivery of institutional 
inpatient, ambulatory, semi-outpatient and outpatient (i.e. at-home) care services. 
These services are de facto implemented in cooperation with municipalities and not-
for-profit organisations of the so-called intermediary sector, i.e. social NGOs of 
different types. 
There is a general lack of more in depth analysis and data on the availability and 
affordability especially regarding formal outpatient services. But findings, limited as 
they may be, suggest that availability of different kinds of long-term care services 
varies to a very substantial degree between (and also partly within) different federal 
provinces (see Fink 2014a) and that, especially in cases of extensive need for care, 
the long-term care cash benefits only covers a fraction of the costs which would arise 
if all respective support would be purchased within formal outpatient care (see e.g. 
RiedelKraus 2010).  
As a matter of fact, the Austrian long-term care system is characterised by a rather 
large sector of informal care. At national average, about 59% of all people in need of 
long-term care are looked after by relatives or friends at home, 22% are looked after 
by their relatives or friends at home as well as receiving formal outpatient care 
services, 16% live in nursing homes and related institutions (inpatient care) and about 
4% are looked after by privately hired caretakers (so-called “24 hour care at home”) 
(see Fink 2014a, 41). 
Up to now the impact of efforts to guarantee nationwide standards of availability and 
accessibility of different kinds of long-term care services remains rather limited. The 
introduction of the so-called long-term care funds (Pflegefonds) in 2011, which were 
subsequently expanded several times, and which provides additional resources from 
the national budget for long-term care services, does  not allow for a substantial 
expansion and harmonisation of respective services given its limited resources. It only 
appears to be sufficient for maintaining the status quo of availability and accessibility 
of services (in times of demand rising due to demographic changes) (see Fink 2014a, 
41f.). 
With regards to more recent reforms, only one substantial new development took 
place. In November 2014 the national government announced the decision to tighten 
access to long-term care cash benefits of “level1” and “level2” (i.e. the two lowest 
benefit levels) to some degree.17 By this, the number of new benefit recipients is 
planned to reduce from 71,000 to 65,000 in 2015. The effect of cost-containment is 
                                                 
15 See e.g. https:www.bmbf.gv.atministeriumvp201320130626a_pu_25024.pdf?4dtiae  
16 However, what purposes long-term care benefits are actually used for by the benefit recipients is not 
being controlled. 
17 See e.g. http:diepresse.comhomepolitikinnenpolitik4597739Regierung-beschliesst-PflegegeldReform 
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estimated to amount to €19 million in 2015 and to €57 million in 2016. The 
government argues that these funds will then be used for a general increase of the   
level of long-term care cash benefits in 2016.18 At the same time no new measures 
have been decided to secure the long-term financial sustainability of the system of 
long-term care (where the need for additional resources is expected to rise 
substantially in future). The same holds true with regards to a possible harmonization 
of accessibility and affordability of respective services, with the goal of offering high 
standards in all Federal Provinces. 
Deficits regarding the availability of ECEC, institutional childcare and long-term care 
are likely to contribute to the outcome that a very high share of people in part-time 
employment report that the main reason for this is “looking after children or 
incapacitated” (Austria: 32.1%; EU-28: 22.1%; see Bouget et al. (2015), Annex 3, 
Table B5). 
2.2.3 Maternal paternal leave schemes 
Regarding maternalpaternal leave, two schemes are of central importance in the case 
of Austria: a) the so-called Wochengeld (maternity pay) and b) Kinderbetreuungsgeld 
(childcare allowance). 
Maternity pay is intended as financial support for the (expectant) mother during 
maternity leave (Mutterschutz). Maternity pay is granted during the following periods: 
in the eight weeks prior to the expected delivery date; on the day the baby is born; in 
the eight weeks following the baby’s birth. For “normal” dependent employees, the 
amount of maternity pay equals the net wage during the last three months plus an 
extra amount compensating for additional wage components such as vacation and 
Christmas bonuses. For other groups the following rules apply: self-employed women 
will receive income-based maternity pay; marginally employed self-insured women 
(only if self-insured pursuant to § 19a ASVG) receive a fixed amount of €8.65 per day 
(amount for 2014) and recipients of benefits according to the Unemployment 
Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz) receive maternity pay amounting to 
180 per cent of the amount of benefits last received.19 
Regarding childcare allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld), which is granted to parents to 
stay at home to care for their children or who reduce their working time for this 
purpose, a rather wide range of different options exists, from which parents can 
choose from. There exist four different models of flat-rate childcare allowance and one 
model of income related childcare allowance.  
For flat-rate childcare allowance no specific preconditions (such as a specific insurance 
record etc.) have to be met. In principle, the benefit is not means-tested, but the 
individual benefit recipients may only have an additional earned income amounting to 
a maximum of 60% of previous incomes, or, if they amounted to less than €16,200 
per year, of €16,200 per year. Depending on the model chosen, the flat-rate childcare 
allowance amounts to between €14.53 and €33 per day and the maximum benefit 
duration between 36 and 12 months, whereby in each model the maximum benefit 
duration is slightly higher if both parents (alternately) decide to apply for childcare 
allowance.20 
Income-related childcare allowance may only be granted if the benefit recipient has 
been gainfully employed and enrolled in social insurance during the six months 
preceding the birth of the child. It amounts to 80 percent of last income, up to a 
maximum of €66 per day (approximately €2,000 per month). It is not means-tested, 
but individual additional income may, as a general principle, not exceed €6,400 per 
                                                 
18 See e.g. http:www.salzburg.comnachrichtenweltsnartikelregierung-fixierte-reform-des-pflegegeldes-
128441 
19 For more details see: https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent143Seite.1430100.html#bene  
20 For more details see: 
https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent143Seite.1430600.html#General_information_about_chil
dcare_allowance  
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year. If one parent claims childcare allowance, income related childcare allowance may 
be granted until the child is 12 months old. If both parents claim childcare allowance, 
the period during which the allowance may be claimed will be extended by the length 
which was taken by the other parent. However, in total childcare allowance can only 
be claimed until the child is 14 months old.21 
Parental leave in the form of childcare allowance shows a very high concentration on 
women, with men much less commonly using this opportunity, and when they do so, 
for a much shorter time than women (see Fink 2013a, 20-21). The latter is true 
irrespective of the fact that fathers after parental leave (i.e. after receiving childcare 
allowance) currently do not face adverse effects on their career (see ReidlSchiffbänker 
2013 for a detailed assessment). For women the effects are much more problematic. 
For them, usually in parental leave much longer than men, re-integration into the 
labour market appears to be much more difficult. And if they find a job they often end 
up in part-time employment only, and often they have to accept a substantial 
reduction of earnings from gainful employment (see Riesenfelder 2013 for a detailed 
assessment). 
This contributes to a kind of vicious circle, where labour market segmentation and 
segregation, which is anyhow a substantial phenomenon in Austria, gets reinforced by 
long career breaks affecting mostly women. Such a development is kind of pre-
programmed due to the lack of institutional childcare (see above), which is again part 
of the legacy of the so-called male breadwinner model, which for a long time 
dominated the overall perception of “sound” family structures in Austria. 
2.2.4 Overall impact 
Deficits and the strong regional differentiation of institutional ECEC, formal childcare 
facilities as well as long-term care contribute to a model in which care for children and 
other family members remains to a rather large degree to be “familialised” (see also 
OECD 2013, 89ff.). These “duties” are primarily fulfilled by women, which contributes 
to the second-highest concentration of part-time employment of women in all EU-
member states (see Bouget et al. (2015), Annex 3, Chart B.3). One other issue – 
again related to the labour market situation of women – is the rather high (negative) 
employment impact for women of having children below the age of 6. In 2013, the 
employment rate in Austria of women in the 20-49 age group without children 
amounted to 84.4%, but in the case of having a child below the age of six it only 
reached 70.5%, which equals a reduction of 13.9 percentage points (see Bouget et al. 
(2015), Annex 3, Chart B.4). At the EU-27 level, the reduction amounted to 14.6 
percentage points. 
With regards to childcare allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld) the vast majority of all 
recipients (ca. 83%) opt for one of the flat-rate long-term models (ca. 59% for the 36 
month model and ca. 24% for the 24 month model).22 This long absence from the 
labour market (or the long period of considerably reduced working time) often implies, 
as already mentioned above, significant adverse effects on future career prospects. 
Overall, rather generous and lengthy parental leave benefits, together with deficits in 
ECEC and institutional childcare are associated with problematic effects on the labour 
market participation of parents, and here especially of mothers. The above described 
attempts to enhance the availability of ECEC and childcare facilities will contribute to 
an improvement of the situation. But given the substantial backlog in this policy area, 
Austria will not manage to be a European “best performer” in this field from a mid-
term perspective.     
                                                 
21 For more details see: 
https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent143Seite.1430600.html#General_information_about_chil
dcare_allowance and https:www.help.gv.atPortal.Nodehlpdpubliccontent8Seite.080612.html  
22 Source : http:www.statistik.atweb_destatickinderbetreuungsgeldbezieherinnen_und_-
bezieher_nach_erwerbsstatus_und_ges_020121.xlsx  
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2.3 Policy measures to address social and labour market exclusion 
2.3.1 Unemployment benefits 
In Austria, the unemployment insurance grants two different benefits: unemployment 
benefit (Arbeitslosengeld) and unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe), which may 
apply after the maximum period for unemployment benefit has expired.  
The coverage of unemployment insurance appears to be rather high, where more than 
90% of all unemployed registered with the Public Employment Service receive a cash 
benefit.23 However, it is largely unclear how big the number of persons is who are de 
facto unemployed, but who do not register with the PES.  
To receive the not means-tested unemployment benefit24 criteria of minimum 
preceding insured employment have to be met. The maximum duration of 
unemployment benefit depends on the age of the claimant and the earlier employment 
and insurance record and may amount to between 20 and 52 weeks. The level of 
unemployment benefit is calculated according to a so-called “basic rate” (usually 
amounting to 55% of earlier net income from gainful employment) and an additional 
family supplement of €0.97 per day per family member. Furthermore, the benefit (not 
the basic rate) is increased in accordance with the “equalisation supplement reference 
rate (ESRR)” (Ausgleichszulagenrichtsatz)25 stipulated in the General Social Security 
Law (from 1st January 2015: €872.631) if the amount of standard supplementary 
benefit rate does not exceed 60% of the (earlier) net income for persons with no 
family supplements. Otherwise the beneficiary gets only the 60% of net income. In 
the case of persons with one or more family supplements, the amount of the ESRR 
benefit rate may not exceed 80% of the (earlier) net income. Otherwise the 
beneficiary gets only the 80% of net income. Overall, by international standards, the 
net replacement rate appears to be rather low for single persons, especially in case of 
somewhat sub-average earlier earned income (with a net replacement rate of de facto 
55% in the case of an earlier earned income of 67% of the average worker’s wage), 
but more favourable in case of dependent family members (with a net replacement 
rate of 73% in case of a one-earner married couple with two children, and an earlier 
earned income of 67% of the average worker’s wage).26 
When the right to receive unemployment benefit has expired, benefit claimants may 
apply for unemployment assistance, where no maximum period applies. 
Unemployment assistance combines the principles of social insurance and welfare, 
whereby different rules apply for different persons (according to age and earlier 
insurance and employment record) regarding means-testing (against other income of 
family members from gainful employment).27 Overall, the latter in many cases implies 
a substantial reduction of the benefit granted. Still, the net replacement rates 
(theoretically for an indefinite period) appear to be substantially higher than the ones 
available in most other EU Member States (e.g. after 25 weeks of unemployment).28 
However, (long-term) unemployment in Austria also goes hand in hand with a high 
incidence of being at-risk-of poverty (see Bouget et al. (2015), Annex 3, Table C15.C). 
No major reforms regarding unemployment insurance grants were introduced in 
Austria during the last years. The only exemption is some relaxation of means-testing 
                                                 
23 Source : http:www.dnet.atelisKennzahlen.aspx  
24 For more details see: http:www.ams.atenpublic-employment-service-austria-amsunemployment-
insurancebenefits  
25 Another term used in English for this minimum benefit rate (at first instance used in old-age insurenace) 
is “equalisation supplement reference rate” (ESRR). 
26 For international comparative data on net replacement rates see: 
http:ec.europa.eueconomy_financedb_indicatorstab  
27 For details see: http:www.ams.atenpublic-employment-service-austria-amsunemployment-
insurancebenefits  
28 For international comparative data on net replacement rates see: 
http:ec.europa.eueconomy_financedb_indicatorstab  
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and somewhat higher minimum benefits within unemployment assistance (decided in 
2010)29, which were enacted together with a reform of the minimum income scheme 
(see below). 
2.3.2 Minimum Income 
Like ECEC, childcare facilities and social services regarding long-term care (see above) 
the minimum income scheme in Austria is the responsibility of the federal provinces. 
Within the earlier system of so-called “social assistance”, this led to a substantial 
regional differentiation of levels of benefits and rules of access. In 2010 the federal 
republic and the federal provinces agreed on a treaty according to §15a of the 
Austrian constitution , following the aim to guarantee uniform minimum standards via 
a new “Guaranteed-Minimum-Income” (GMI) scheme (Bedarfsorientierte 
Mindestsicherung), which then replaced social assistance in all federal provinces. This 
treaty outlines the most important features of the GMI, which then had to be settled in 
more detail in legislation decided at the level of the federal provinces. The federal 
provinces Vienna, Lower Austria and Salzburg introduced their versions of the GMI as 
from 01.09.2010. The other six federal provinces followed their lead, with Upper 
Austria being the last federal province implementing GMI as from 01.10.2011. It is 
important to note that the replacement of social assistance by GMI did not imply a 
true harmonisation of the minimum income schemes of the federal provinces, but 
more a coordination, defining basic features and minimum standards. 
Within social assistance, cash transfers used to be calculated on the basis of so-called 
“reference rates”, which to a large degree differed between federal provinces (see 
FinkGrand 2009, 15). The term “reference rate” is in this sense misleading, as the 
respective benefit levels were not calculated according to household reference budgets 
(or any other “objective” absolute measure), but were arbitrarily set in the respective 
legislations of the federal provinces. Within GMI, the national state and the federal 
provinces agreed to use the equalisation supplement reference rate (ESRR) of the old-
age insurance (Ausgleichszulagenrichtsatz) as the dominant point of orientation. 
However, as with the earlier reference rates in social assistance, the ESRR is again not 
defined by any “objective” absolute (like household reference budgets) or relative 
measure (like the “EU-at-risk-of-poverty-threshold” defined as 60% of the equalised 
median net income), but again set arbitrarily. The calculation of respective minimum 
benefits for different household compositions uses a weighting system  which is based 
on the modified OECD-scale of equivalency (also used at EU-level for calculating the 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold), but in a somewhat modified way, taking into  account 
family benefits which are of a universal character in Austria (see Fink 2012, 15 for 
details). What has to be stressed is that these benefit levels are minimum benefit 
levels, and that the federal provinces in their respective legislations may define higher 
ones. 
When assessing the actual level of benefits within GMI, the at-risk-of poverty 
threshold, defined as 60% of the equalised median net income, may be taken as a 
reference point (see Fink 2012, 18). The results indicate that benefits are in all cases 
lower than the at-risk-of poverty threshold, even when family benefits are also taken 
into account.   
The reform of replacing social assistance by GMI came with a number of other 
important universal standards (ibid., 18-21). The obligation to pay back benefits (in 
case of future financial improvement) and the obligation of close relatives to refund, 
which existed in a number of federal provinces, were abolished. Recipients of GMI are 
now in any case fully integrated into health insurance. Savings up to a specific sum (5 
x the ESRR) are now no longer taken into account in means-testing. The architecture 
of the GMI, when compared to social assistance, also contains some (minor) additional 
financial incentives to take up or increase employment. And contrary to earlier social 
                                                 
29 For details see: http:www.parlament.gv.atPAKTVHGXXIVII_00628index.shtml  
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assistance, there now exists an “official” commitment that (also “sole”)30 recipients  
of GMI have full access to all measures of active labour market policy (ALMP) offered 
by the Public Employment Service (PES). Furthermore, additional ALMP-measures 
were established, specifically dedicated to recipients of GMI. 
Numbers deriving from the EU-SILC indicate that the impact of GMI on the at-risk-of 
poverty rate is very limited, as it is not reduced by GMI-benefits (see Fink 2013a, 27). 
This can be explained by the fact that the benefit levels of GMI are generally lower 
than the at-risk-of poverty threshold (even if additional family cash benefits are taken 
into account). However, GMI is likely to reduce the depth of poverty considerably. 
Unfortunately no published data are available on the effect of different social transfers 
on the poverty gap, which would display the respective effects. 
The number of recipients of minimum income increased considerably in Austria over 
the last decades (see Fink 2012, 24). Within the new GMI-scheme the number of 
persons receiving such a benefit rose from 193,276 in 2011 to 221,341 in 2012 and 
then further to 238,392 in 2013.  
2.3.3 Active labour market policies (ALMP) 
It is fair to say that Austria – following an upgrade during the last two decades – 
nowadays shows a rather well established and differentiated system of ALMP-
measures, most of them provided by or on behalf of the Public Employment Service 
(PES). Measures by the PES can be grouped according to three main types: a) 
“qualification” (for unemployed as well as for people in active employment), b) 
“employment promotion” (e.g. via company integration subsidies such as wage 
subsidies for employers employing former long-term unemployed; short-term work 
benefits; employment projects etc.) and c) “support” (with a wide range of different 
measures applied) (see for details on respective programmes e.g. BMASK 2013). 
Spending for ALMP in Austria considerably increased during the peak years of the 
financial and economic crisis (2009 and 2010), with related outlays (for ALMP in the 
narrow sense) amounting to more than €1.3 billion. Spending for ALMP was reduced in 
2011 and 2012 (to about €1.17 billion) on the back of a reduction of overall 
unemployment. But then – as a reaction to the once again worsening labour market 
situation – increased anew in 2013 (to about €1.27 billion).  The share of all persons 
affected by unemployment and registered with the PES, who took part in one or more 
ALMP-measures amounted to approx. 46% in 2008, to 54% in 2009, to 52% in 2010, 
to 45% in 2011, to 47% in 2012 and to approx. 50% in 2013.31 This means that the 
outreach of ALMP expanded during the peak years of the financial and economic crisis, 
but then reduced again to some degree thereafter. As already mentioned above, 
(“sole”) recipients of GMI have – since 2010 – full access to all ALMP-measures by the 
PES. However, not all recipients of GMI are de facto registered with the PES (in 2013 
this applied for ca. 40% of all GMI-recipients of working age).  
The ALMP-budget for 2014 amounts to €1.37 billion, the one for 2015 to €1.39 billion.  
Furthermore, an additional “labour market package for older workers” was decided on 
in March 2014, with its implementation starting as from April 2014. This package 
comprises additional measures of active labour market policy, where a total additional 
budget of €350 million (for the years 2014-2016) is made available.     
Overall, it is fair to say that all relevant political players in Austria show a strong and 
ongoing commitment when it comes to measures of ALMP and their financing, with 
Austria being one of the EU Member States with an elaborated and differentiated 
system of ALMP and rather high respective spending (especially when taking into 
account the respective level of unemployment; see Bouget et al. (2015), Annex 3, 
Chart B.2). What should explicitly be stressed in this context is the special emphasis 
                                                 
30 “Sole” recipients of minimum income are persons who do not at the same time receive a benefit from 
unemployment insurance. 
31 Source: http:www.dnet.atelisKennzahlen.aspx & own calculations. 
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given to programmes for young people in Austria, which helped to keep youth-
unemployment rather low (at least by international standards). 
2.3.4 Other Social services 
Different kinds of personalized social services are offered by different institutions of 
different levels (i.e. national, regional, local), which makes it difficult to give an overall 
overview of the wide variety of services available. As with ECEC, child-care and long-
term care, a considerable differentiation appears to exist between different federal 
provinces and municipalities. This for example holds for services for homeless people 
or for people endangered by homelessness, for people with psychosocial disorders or 
problems with drug addiction or in cases of problems of excessive indebtedness. Here, 
the welfare offices within GMI as well as the PES may serve as an intermediary 
facilitating access to related services, but de facto no real one-stop-shop exists with 
the explicit responsibility to plan and enforce an integrated personal strategy for the 
improvement of the situation of persons with multiple social problems. Given the 
rather fragmented landscape and diversity of additional social services in place it is 
largely unclear (from a nation-wide perspective) if and to what degree related offers 
were expanded more recently or not. At the same time no up to date and 
comprehensive assessments are available on the actual effectiveness of related 
measures. In other words: The overall impact of the existing programmes is largely 
unclear at the time of writing.   
2.3.5 Overall impact  
From an international comparative perspective Austria performs rather well on the 
long-term unemployment indicator (unemployment lasting 12 months or more; 2013: 
AT: 24.3% of total unemployment; EU-28: 47.4% see Bouget et al. (2015), Annex 3, 
Table C8).32 However, national registry data points to a rising number of persons not 
managing to enter into lasting employment, but where unemployment is just 
interspersed by rather short spells of employment (or illness). This phenomenon is 
subject to the national concept of so-called “long-term unoccupied” 
(Langzeitbeschäftigungslose), counting persons who have been unemployed for at 
least 365 days, where an interruption of unemployment of up to 62 days (due to 
employment andor illness) is not taken into account in the sense of registering as a 
new episode of unemployment. The number of people registered with the PES defined 
as “long-term unoccupied” increased from ca. 34,500 in 2008 to ca. 82,000 in 2014.33 
Regarding a lasting integration into employment for specific groups (especially those 
with very low formal qualification) substantial challenges are highlighted by a recent 
evaluation of the minimum income scheme (GMI) (see Riesenfelder et al. 2014). The 
issue of increasing problems in achieving lasting employment for specific groups of the 
unemployed (inter alia especially people with low formal qualification) gained 
increased political attention recently, and plans are currently under development to 
revise the ALMP-programmes of the PES to address these.34 What would also be useful 
would be to give more emphasis to additional personalized services and to make sure 
that such services are available nationwide on a regular basis. This would, however, 
require a strategy to overcome or at least reduce the problematic effects of 
institutional fragmentation in this policy area, with the goal of achieving minimum 
standards regarding quality, availability and accessibility. 
 
In this context, it should also be stressed that long-term unemployment implies a very 
high rate of being at-risk-of poverty. In the case that “unemployment” was the most 
frequent activity status in the previous year, the at-risk-of poverty rate amounted to 
                                                 
32 Source: Eurostat, LFS, indicator [une_ltu_a] 
33 Source: AMS; http://iambweb.ams.or.at/ambweb/; table GÜ500. 
34 Reportedly, it is planned to give more emphasis to long-term measures instead of short-term measures, 
which have dominated until now. 
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45.7% in Austria in 2013 (people in the age group 15-64), which is about the EU-28 
average level (46.5%).35     
  
                                                 
35 Source: Eurostat Database; EU-SILC, Indicator [ilc_li04]. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Children in institutional childcare in % of children in the respective 
age-group; 1995-2013 
  
Federal Province 
Year Austria 
Burgen- 
land 
Carinthia 
Lower 
Austria 
Upper 
Austria 
Salzburg Styria Tyrol 
Vorarl- 
berg 
Vienna 
 
Children in the age 0 to 2 years 
1995 4.6 6.0 1.3 2.8 2.4 2.3 1.3 1.1 0.3 16.9 
1996 5.0 6.8 1.3 2.8 2.5 2.7 1.4 1.2 0.3 18.3 
1997 5.4 6.4 1.1 3.2 2.5 3.6 1.6 1.6 0.3 19.7 
1998 6.3 6.5 1.7 3.7 3.0 4.7 2.2 1.8 0.4 22.4 
1999 7.1 7.2 1.5 4.2 3.6 5.7 2.1 2.2 1.3 24.1 
2000 7.7 8.8 1.7 4.7 4.1 6.8 2.1 2.4 3.0 24.3 
2001 8.4 9.7 2.0 5.1 4.8 7.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 25.2 
2002 8.7 9.8 7.5 5.4 4.8 7.3 3.6 2.9 3.8 23.6 
2003 8.5 10.7 10.5 4.0 4.6 7.5 3.5 3.1 8.2 21.4 
2004 9.2 10.7 9.5 5.9 4.8 7.9 4.1 3.3 9.5 21.7 
2005 10.2 13.4 10.1 6.4 5.3 8.5 4.5 10.4 8.0 22.1 
2006 10.8 14.6 10.8 6.8 5.5 9.0 5.2 11.4 9.4 22.3 
2007 11.8 15.3 12.7 8.7 6.0 9.9 5.6 12.3 11.6 23.1 
2008 14.0 16.6 12.3 13.8 6.7 11.3 6.5 14.2 13.8 25.5 
2009 15.8 23.5 14.0 15.5 9.4 12.9 7.7 15.1 15.1 26.8 
2010 17.1 26.9 15.3 16.7 10.3 13.7 8.8 16.8 17.0 28.1 
2011 19.7 29.0 16.5 21.2 11.2 14.1 10.0 18.0 17.3 33.2 
2012 20.8 30.1 18.4 21.0 11.9 16.2 11.2 19.7 19.0 34.8 
2013 23.0 31.3 18.5 22.3 12.8 17.6 11.9 21.7 20.5 40.3 
 
Children in the age 3 to 5 years 
1995 70.6 88.3 52.3 81.4 71.4 67.5 61.9 64.4 63.5 75.9 
1996 71.7 89.2 53.7 82.3 72.2 68.7 63.8 65.9 64.3 76.7 
1997 73.2 91.0 56.5 83.1 74.2 70.4 65.4 67.3 64.7 78.0 
1998 74.7 91.6 59.6 85.0 76.0 73.0 66.8 69.9 65.4 77.5 
1999 76.1 92.9 61.4 85.8 77.1 75.2 68.9 71.4 68.9 78.3 
2000 77.6 94.4 63.6 86.6 79.0 76.8 69.7 73.2 70.5 79.9 
2001 79.0 96.5 65.2 87.7 80.2 78.2 71.8 75.1 73.1 80.3 
2002 80.7 97.5 70.2 88.6 81.1 80.4 74.7 76.3 73.9 81.6 
2003 81.8 95.4 71.6 89.1 81.8 80.2 75.7 77.5 83.2 82.3 
2004 82.1 95.3 68.7 88.8 82.6 82.2 76.9 79.1 84.0 81.7 
2005 82.7 96.4 72.8 88.7 83.2 82.7 77.6 83.9 79.7 81.4 
2006 83.5 95.8 74.9 90.4 84.2 84.0 78.0 84.9 81.6 80.6 
2007 84.9 96.5 78.2 91.5 84.7 84.5 79.8 85.7 81.9 83.1 
2008 86.5 97.3 81.0 91.4 85.7 85.4 81.6 88.0 86.4 85.3 
2009 88.5 99.5 81.3 93.4 90.6 86.9 83.7 88.8 89.8 86.0 
2010 90.7 98.8 83.2 95.2 91.3 89.0 85.3 89.8 91.3 91.3 
2011 90.3 99.2 84.1 95.6 92.1 89.3 83.9 90.5 89.7 88.9 
2012 90.6 99.0 84.8 95.7 92.3 90.7 84.3 91.6 92.3 88.3 
2013 90.8 98.6 85.9 95.5 92.7 90.3 84.8 92.1 93.7 88.3 
 
Children in the age 6 to 9 years 
1995 7.0 1.5 6.1 2.1 6.3 5.5 2.6 2.3 0.6 24.9 
1996 7.1 1.2 6.1 2.1 6.4 5.2 2.9 2.1 0.7 25.0 
1997 7.7 1.8 6.8 3.5 6.8 5.5 3.0 2.2 0.8 25.5 
1998 7.8 1.7 7.4 4.5 7.1 6.0 3.3 2.3 1.1 24.4 
1999 7.8 1.6 7.4 4.5 7.6 5.6 3.0 2.0 0.9 24.2 
2000 8.4 2.2 8.1 5.3 8.2 5.6 3.4 2.2 1.5 25.0 
2001 8.8 2.2 8.7 6.0 8.9 5.7 3.4 2.3 1.5 25.2 
2002 9.4 2.8 9.1 7.4 9.0 6.2 4.0 2.8 2.2 25.3 
2003 10.1 3.4 10.1 8.9 9.7 6.8 4.3 2.6 3.0 25.1 
2004 11.1 4.6 12.0 10.5 10.1 7.1 4.6 3.1 4.1 26.5 
2005 11.9 5.2 14.6 11.6 10.7 8.0 4.8 3.2 4.8 27.2 
2006 12.9 5.4 16.4 12.7 11.9 8.6 5.2 3.5 6.6 27.8 
2007 13.8 6.5 17.8 13.1 12.9 9.7 5.5 4.0 6.6 29.3 
2008 14.5 7.5 18.9 13.4 14.1 10.2 5.6 4.4 7.7 29.9 
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2009 15.4 10.4 18.8 14.5 15.9 10.2 5.7 5.1 9.5 30.3 
2010 16.3 12.0 19.4 15.5 17.5 10.4 5.7 5.9 11.3 30.7 
2011 16.0 12.3 19.6 16.0 18.7 10.2 5.6 6.8 13.5 26.7 
2012 16.4 12.0 19.6 16.6 19.3 10.5 5.6 8.0 15.9 26.3 
2013 16.5 10.9 19.8 16.3 19.7 10.6 5.8 8.7 16.2 25.9 
Source: Statistik Austria, Kindertagesheimstatistik, 
http:www.statistik.atweb_destatickinderbetreuungsquoten_nach_altersgruppen_1995_bis_2013_021659.xls
x   
 
Chart A.1 
 
Source: Eurostat Database (indicator [spr_exp_gdp] 
Chart A.2 
 
* 2012 or most recent year available (EU-28, EU-15, IE, ES, CY, LU, MT, PL: 2011; EL, UK: 2010). 
Source: Eurostat indicators [lmp_expsumm] & [une_rt_a] & own calculations. 
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Chart A.3. 
 
* Concentration of part-time employment on women: rate of part-time employment of women divided by 
the rate of part-time employment of men. 
Source: LFS, Eurostat Database; indic. [lfsa_eppga] & own calculations. 
 
Chart A.4. 
 
*Employment impact: Employment rate of women in the age 20-49 with a child in the age below six years 
minus employment rate of women in the age 20-49 without children. 
Source: Eurostat Database; indic. [lfst_hheredch] & own calculations 
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